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From the British Periodical The Saturday Review, 29 March.
Not more than a year ago, the Times dwelt with much emphasis on the fact that the Americans had steadily refused to avail themselves of the new-fangled device of iron-plated ships. That a people so adventurous and skilful in mechanical appliances should have pronounced the new invention a chimera, was supposed to be a serious ground for doubting the wisdom of the course which France had initiated and England sluggishly followed. No one could then have imagined that the first real test of armor-plated ships in actual warfare would be furnished by America. It is only within a few weeks that either of the belligerents has had a plated ship ready for sea; and, as if to supply the crucial experiment which was wanting to build up the confidence of our naval architects, the Merrimac and the Monitor have exhibited their powers of attack and defence, and proved that even imperfect specimens (as they probably are) of their class are quite capable of sweeping from the ocean whole fleets of the old wooden liners.
So far as mere experimental trials could suffice to do so, the qualities of our Warrior have been fully tested. Facsimiles of her plates have been battered at short ranges by 100-pounder guns, and the ship herself has proved her speed and her sea-worthiness under the most trying circumstances. Still, Shoeburyness and the Bay of Biscay failed to bring conviction home to the minds of many who would be satisfied with nothing less than an actual engagement, such as the last American accounts report for our instruction. One important power of destruction possessed by these vessels—that of running down an enemy’s ship—has been falling so much into discredit that, in several of our more recent ships, the beak has been abandoned. There was, it is true, nothing but theory on either side; but while the advocates of the new, or rather the revived, mode of warfare proved to demonstration that nothing made of wood could possibly resist the shock of an iron vessel of several thou sand tons weight, the cautious doubters, who have had more influence with the Admiralty, insisted that the attacking ship would suffer as severely as her opponent, that masts would go by the board, engines would be torn to pieces, and screws would be disabled, by the collision which might send an enemy to the bottom of the sea.
The battle of Newport News has done much to clear up these doubts. The trial was not one very favorable to the system of armor-plating. The Merrimac was a wooden frigate, not built to carry the load of iron under which she now has to stagger. She is said to be sunk so deep in the water that the experiment of casing her was at first thought to be a failure, and it is pretty certain that she would fare but ill in a storm on the Atlantic. With all these disadvantages, she has proved herself capable, in smooth water, of destroying an adversary with terrible facility. The story of her engagement with the Cumberland, a powerful frigate armed with 100-pounder guns, is simple enough. She steamed up, received the fire of the enemy with perfect indifference, fired a couple of shots, and then dashed into the frigate’s side and left an opening on the water-line of seven feet in diameter. So little does she seem to have suffered from the shock that a second blow of the beak was administered without delay, and the Cumberland straightway began to fill and in a short time sank. Having crushed one adversary, the Merrimac, apparently uninjured, gave battle to another, which had no choice but to surrender, and from all that can be gathered of the details of the affair, there is no reason to doubt that the iron monster could have destroyed a score of wooden frigates, had such a fleet been there to oppose her.
New York was, naturally enough, in the utmost excitement and alarm at the first report of the disaster; and so completely was the balance of the naval power supposed to be turned by a single ship against the overwhelming preponderance of the Northern navy, that the ignominious and ruinous project of destroying the harbor of New York was urgently pressed upon the authorities. If the Merrimac were capable of an Atlantic voyage, there was really nothing extravagant in the supposition that she might annihilate the whole blockading squadron in detail, and finish her exploits by steaming past the batteries of Sandy Hook and shelling New York at her leisure. The opportune arrival of the Monitor, however, gave the first check to the Southern triumph. The two champion ships seemed practically to represent in themselves the rival navies, and for the moment, if not forever, a single iron ship counted for more in the salvation of the Federalists than all the fleets with which they have swarmed round the coasts of the South. Whatever the precise result of the single combat was, the meeting of the Merrimac and the Monitor has conclusively established the overwhelming importance of iron-plated vessels. The Monitor carried guns far heavier than any that are known in the British navy. But the shots of 200 pound weight which she hurled against the sloping iron roof of the Confederate frigate, sometimes at long ranges, and sometimes at close quarters, for hour after hour, produced no perceptible effect; and when at last the Merrimac drew off, it was for the time even doubted whether she had really suffered injury, or whether she was merely trying a ruse to circumvent her impregnable opponent. As for the Monitor, she came absolutely scatheless out of the tremendous cannonade of the Merrimac. Not a plate was damaged, and not a man was hurt, with the exception of the commander, who received a wound as the penalty of his want of caution in not keeping his head safely behind the iron bulwarks.
In attack and in defence, these two ships, inferior as they are to the examples of the same class which we already possess, have almost surpassed the expectations of the most confident advocates of iron. The armor-plating principle has finally passed out of the experimental stage; and, now that the supposed cause for hesitation is removed, there is no longer any justification for delay on the part of our Admiralty in completing such a fleet of iron-cased ships as shall secure to this country the naval supremacy which is the condition of her power and existence. As yet our progress has been less rapid than that of France, and after the decisive trial of the American ships we may be sure that not only the Federal and Confederate States, but every European country which pretends to be a naval power, will henceforth concentrate all attention upon the class of vessels which will soon make wooden steam ships as obsolete as sailing frigates have now become. The combined strength of all these navies is the measure of the defence with which England must be prepared, and something far beyond the energy which has yet been shown will be needed to keep the position which belongs to this country. The iron fleet of France alone includes, beside the Magenta and Solferino, four frigates carrying from thirty to forty guns, and a corvette, all of which might be ready for sea within three months. Besides these, there are on the stocks eleven heavy frigates, six corvettes, a ship specially destined for running-down purposes, and sixty plated gunboats. We have probably the best model of all the armor-plated ships as yet afloat, but the Warrior can only be in one place at a time, and in numbers our iron fleet is far below that which France alone has in various stages of preparation. England has the means of building vessels of this description much more rapidly than all the rest of the world combined, and has the strongest motives for outstripping all competitors. There need be no fear now that money so spent will be thrown away, and it will in all probability be found that iron ships, costly as they are, will surpass the old models as much in ultimate economy as in power. Whether this be so or not, they are now ascertained to be irresistible, and we shall soon learn to leave out all other ships from the accounts of the strength of the navy. The second reconstruction of the fleet within a few years has ceased to be a matter of speculation, and has become an absolute necessity. It will be the cheapest and safest course to recognize the fact at once and to use with promptitude the only means by which the power of England can be maintained.
In some respects, the success of the American ships is almost greater than we could have desired. An impregnable dockyard seems really to have become an impossibility; for a ship which can bear a close cannonade from the heaviest guns for four or five hours can certainly go anywhere where there is water to float her, in spite even of such forts and batteries as are in course of construction for the defence of Portsmouth and Chatham. For the first time, the art of naval attack seems to have established its superiority over the strongest land defences which can be raised; and until some new plan shall be devised for restoring the balance, the only possible precaution is to secure a timely preponderance in the arm which threatens to sweep all resistance before it.
Littell, E. (editor), "The Battle of Newport News," Littell's Living Age, No. 936, May 10, 1862, pp. 293 - 294, Boston: Littell, Son, & Co.
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