Report Of The President's Commission On
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  1. For times cited in narrative, please refer to the "Summary of Events" compiled by the Commission's Technical Assessment Force.

  2. Commission Hearing, May 19, 1979, pp. 24, 27-28. For a discussion of the mental health effects of the TMI accident, see "Behavioral Effects" compiled by the Commission's Public Health and Safety Task Force. "

  3. General Public Utilities Corporation, 1978 Annual Report. For a full discussion of the Commission's investigation of GPU and subsidiary. Metropolitan Edison, see "Report of the Office of Counsel on the Role of the Managing Utility and Its Suppliers."

  4. See history section of "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."  

  5. See "How a Nuclear Reactor Works," a lecture presented by Commissioner Theodore B. Taylor to members of the Commission,   April 26, 1979.  

  6. Final Safety Analysis Report, TMI-2, Vol. 4, pp. 4.2-37, 4.3-20.  See also Taylor, supra.

  7. Final Safety Analysis Report, TMI-2, Vol. 4, pp. 4.2-4, 4.2-5, J 4.3-19; figures 4.2-4, 4.3-25, 4.2-26; and Vol. 7, p. 7.8-3; figure 7.8-4.

  8. See Taylor, supra. See also Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Alternative Event Sequences."

  9. Final Safety Analysis Report, TMI-2, Vol. 3, p. 3.8-38.

  10. See Technical Assessment Task Force reports on "Core Damage," "Chemistry," "Thermal Hydraulics," and "Alternative Event Sequences."

  11. For a complete discussion of the pilot-operated relief valve, see Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Pilot-Operated Relief Valve Design and Performance," and section on PORV failure history in "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Role of the Managing Utility and Its Suppliers." See also discussion of "safety-related" items in "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."

  12. Commission Hearing, May 30, 1979, pp. 10, 115, 152-153.

  13. For a full discussion of Metropolitan Edison's and Babcock & Wilcox's treatment of problems associated with pilot-operated relief valves, see "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Role of the Managing Utility and Its Suppliers."

  14. For a discussion on operator training, see Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Selection, Training, Qualification, and Licensing of Three Mile Island Reactor Operating Personnel."  See also Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Technical Assessment of Operating, Abnormal, and Emergency Procedures," sections on attention to experience, TMI-2 site management, and procedures in "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Role of the Managing Utility and Its Suppliers;" and section on operator training and licensing in "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."

  15. Id.

  16. For a full discussion of the control room, see Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Control Room Design and Performance." See also "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Role of the Managing Utility and Its Suppliers" for a discussion of the TMI-2 control room design history and design performance during the accident, and "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission" on the NRC's consideration of human factors in design review during plant licensing.

  17. Commission Hearing, May 30, 1979, p. 168.

  18. See Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Condensate Polishing System." See also section on attention to experience in "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Role of the Managing Utility and Its Suppliers."

  19. For a discussion on operator training, see Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Selection, Training, Qualification, and Licensing of Three Mile Island Reactor Operating Personnel."  See also Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Technical Assessment of Operating, Abnormal, and Emergency Procedures;" sections on attention to experience, TMI-2 site management, and procedures of "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Role of the Managing Utility and Its Suppliers;" and section on operator training and licensing in "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Nuclear Regultory Commission."

  20. Commission Hearing, May 30, 1979, p. 168.

  21. See Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Technical Assessment of Operating,'Abnormal, and Emergency Procedures." See also discuss| of pressurizer level and "going solid" in procedures section of  | "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Role of the Managing  Utility and Its Suppliers." 

  22. Commission Hearing, May 30, 1979, p. 194. |

  23. Commission Hearing, May 30, 1979, pp. 114-115; Commission Hearing, May 31, 1979, p. 40.

  24. See Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Closed Emergency   Feedwater Valves."                         

  25. See Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Technical Assessment 1 of Operating, Abnormal, and Emergency Procedures." See also discussion of emergency procedures for loss of reactor coolant and for      identifying the open pilot-operated relief valve in procedures    section of "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Role of the Managing Utility and Its Suppliers."

  26. Commission Hearing, May 30, 1979, p. 128.              

  27. Commission Hearing, May 30, 1979, p. 129.              

  28. See Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Technical Assessment of Operating, Abnormal, and Emergency Procedures." See also discussion of emergency procedures for loss of reactor coolant and for      identifying the open pilot-operated relief valve in procedures    section of "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Role of  the Managing Utility and Its Suppliers."              

  29. Commission Hearing, May 30, 1979, p. 146.             |

  30. See "Summary Sequence of Events."                

  31. Commission Hearing, May 31, 1979, p. 38.            

  32. Commission Hearing, May 30, 1979, p. 187.           

  33. Commission Hearing, May 30, 1979, p. 161.           

  34. See Technical Assessment Task Force reports on "Core Damage,"    "Thermal Hydraulics," and "Chemistry." See also section on Met Ed's understanding of core condition on March 28 in "Report of the     Office of Chief Counsel on the Role of the Managing Utility and Its  Suppliers."                             

  35. Rogers deposition, pp. 84-85.                 

  36. Commission Hearing, May 30, 1979, pp. 119-120.           

  37. See Technical Assessment Task Force reports on "Core Damage" and   "Chemistry."

  38. Final Safety Analysis Report,•TMI-2, Vol. 13, p. 13A-3.

  39. Commission Hearing, May 31, 1979, pp. 6-7.

  40. Prepared testimony -of Gary Miller, Commission Hearing, May 31, 1979: "TMI Station March 28, 1979, Incident Statement by> G. P. Miller, Station Manager," pp. 3°4.

  41. NRC Region I answering service log. For a complete discussion of the emergency response during the TMI accident, see "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on Emergency Response," which is in the form of a chronology. For a discussion of Met Ed's management of the accident, see section on management approach to the emergency of "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Role of the Managing Utility and Its Suppliers."

  42. Dornsife deposition, p. 20.

  43. Final Safety Analysis Report, TMI-2, Vol. 13, p. 13A-4.

  44. For a discussion of containment and isolation, see Technical Assessment Task .Force report on "Containment."

  45. Mattson deposition, pp. 12-14. For a complete discussion of "grandfathering" and other matters related to plant licensing, see section on plant licensing in "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."

  46. For a complete discussion on selection of containment isolation criteria for TMI-2, see section on containment isolation criteria in "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the. Role of the Managing Utility and Its Suppliers."

  47. See Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Containment."

  48. Commission Hearing, May 31, 1979, p. 51.

  49. Commission staff notes of Pintek interview, pp. 1-2.

  50. For a discussion of news media coverage of the TMI accident, see "Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force."

  51. Commission Hearing, May 19, 1979, p. 125.

  52. Commission Hearing, May 31, 1979, pp. 236-237.

  53. In addition to "Summary Sequence of Events," please refer to "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on Emergency Response" for times and dates cited.

  54. Commission Hearing, May 19, 1979, p. 15.

  55. Commission Hearing, August 2, 1979, pp. 180-183.

  56. Transcript of Scranton news conference, March 28, 1979, 10:55 a.m.

  57. Id. For a discussion on radiation exposure to the public during the accident and its potential health effects, see "Health Physics and Dosimetry" and "Radiation Health Effects" compiled by the Public Health and Safety Task Force.

  58. Commission Hearing, August 2, 1979, p. 184. See also discussion of information sources in "Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force."

  59. See Technical Assessment Task Force reports on "Thermal Hydraulics,3 "Chemistry," and "Technical Assessment of Operating, Abnormal, and Emergency Procedures." See also discussion of rapid  depressurization in emergency response section of "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."

  60. For a discussion of the radiation exposure to workers during the accident, see "Health Physics and Dosimetry." For a discussion on NRC requirements for Met Ed's provisions for worker protection, see "Public Health and Epidemiology."

  61. Commission Hearing, May 31, 1979, p. 57.

  62. Commission Hearing, May 31, 1979, p. 58.

  63. Rogers deposition, p. 114.

  64. Commission Hearing, May 31, 1979, p. 59.

  65. For a discussion on radiation exposure to the public during the  accident and its potential health effects, see "Health Physics and Dosimetry" and "Radiation Health Effects."

  66. Governor's log, March 28, 1979, p. 3.

  67. Transcript of Scranton news conference, March 28, 1979, 4:30 p.m.

  68. Id.

  69. Commission Hearing, May 19, 1979, pp. 37, 41.

  70. Dauphin County Office of Emergency Preparedness log, March 29, 1979.

  71. For a discussion of radiation monitoring during the accident, see  "Health Physics and Dosimetry."  

  72. MacLeod deposition, pp. 21-26.

  73. Robbins deposition, pp. 36-37.

  74. MacLeod deposition, pp. 29-36.

  75. Reilly interview, pp. 92-94; Gallina deposition, pp. 56-57; Smith deposition, p. 36; and Gerusky interview, pp. 24-25. See also "Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force."

  76. NRC telephone transcript, March 29, 1979, 02-228-CH 6/KD-2-6.

  77. Pennsylvania DER news release, March 29, 1979. See also "Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force" and "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on Emergency Response."

  78. Higgins deposition, pp. 42, 4.5-46; Gallina deposition, p. 60; Critchlow interview, first and second tape, pp. 15-18.

  79. Barrett deposition, pp. 39-50.

  80. Commission Hearing, August 2, 1979, pp. 316.

  81. Commission  Hearing, May 31, 1979, pp. 172-181.

  82. Commission Hearing, August 2, 1979, pp. 298-299.

  83. Id., pp. 303-316.

  84. Collins deposition, pp. 70-72; Scranton interview, p. 54; Gerusky deposition, pp. 53-54; Dornsife deposition, p. 76; NRC telephone transcript, March 30, 1979, 03-019-CH 2/20-SW-10.

  85. Molloy deposition, pp. 48-49; Commission Hearing, August 2, 1979, pp. 10-11.

  86. Commission Hearing, May 31, 1979, pp. 257-258.

  87. Thornburgh deposition, p. 77.

  88. Commission Hearing, August 21, 1979, p. 10.

  89. Gerusky deposition, pp. 64-65, 67.

  90. Commission Hearing, August 21, 1979, p. 25.

  91. Transcript of Herbein news conference, March 30, 1979, 11:00 a.m.

  92. See "Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force."

  93. Watson deposition, pp. 73-76, 90-91.

  94. Commission Hearing, May 19, 1979, p. 221.

  95. Commission Hearing, May 19, 1979, p. 38. For a discussion of the mental health effects of the TMI accident, see "Behavioral Effects.'

  96. Commission Hearing, May 19, 1979, p. 127.

  97. Henderson deposition, pp. 71-73; Commission Hearing, August 2, 1979, pp. 12-18. For full discussion on emergency planning and response, see "Report of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Task Force," "Public Health and Epidemiology," "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on Emergency Preparedness," and "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on Emergency Response." For dates and times in the following section, refer to the latter report.

  98. Dieckamp deposition, pp. 129-136.

  99. Denton deposition, pp. 101-102. For a complete discussion of the events concerning the hydrogen bubble, see "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on Emergency Response." See also technical analysis of hydrogen production in Technical Assessment Task Force on "Chemistry."

  100. Knouse interview, pp. 71-73; transcript of Denton-Thornburgh news conference, March 30, 1979.          x

  101. Waldman interview, pp. 68-69.

  102. Watson deposition, pp. 52-57; Eidenberg deposition, p. 47-48.

  103. Commission Hearing, August 2, 1979, pp. 194-195.

  104. For a complete recount of the potassium iodide story, see "Public Health and Epidemiology" and "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on Emergency Response."

  105. Villforth deposition, pp. 33-35; "Chronology of Events at HEW Regarding TMI, 3/28/79 through 4/30/79."

  106. For a complete discussion of the events concerning the hydrogen bubble, see "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on Emergency Response." See also technical analysis of hydrogen production in Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Chemistry."

  107. Mattson deposition, p. 184.

  108. Id., p. 186.

  109. Commission Hearing, August 22, 1979, pp. 294-296. See also Mattson deposition, pp. 178-180.

  110. Mattson deposition, p. 179.

  111. Id., pp. 190-191.

  112. For a full discussion on this incident, see "Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force."

  113. Transcript of Denton-Thornburgh news conference, March 31, 1979, part 1, p. 3.

  114. For a more detailed discussion of HEW's activities during the accident, see "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on Emergency Response" and "Public Health and Epidemiology."

  115. Molloy deposition, pp. 81-100. See also Commission Hearing, August 2, 1979, p. 16.

  116. Mattson deposition, p. 192.

  117. Mattson interview, cassette 16, parts 5 and 6, pp. 34-35.

  118. Id., cassette 17, parts 7 and 8, p. 4.

  119. For a discussion on the NRC commissioners and their role in the management of the agency and during the emergency, see "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."

  120. Transcript of Denton news conference, April 2, 1979. For a discussion of NRC public statements on the hydrogen bubble problems, see "Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force."

  121. Mattson interview, cassette 17, parts 7 and 8, p. 7. See also "Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force."

  122. For a complete recount of the potassium iodide story, see "Public Health and Epidemiology" and "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on Emergency Response."

  123. For discussion of Met Ed's recovery efforts, see section on TMI-2 recovery program in "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Role of the Managing Utility and Its Suppliers" and Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Recovery."

  124. Molloy deposition, pp. 115-117. See also "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on Emergency Response" and "Report of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Task Force."

  125. For a discussion of TMI-2's recovery program, see Technical Assessment Task Force report on "Recovery" and the TMI-2 recovery program section of "Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on the Role of the Managing Utility and Its Suppliers."