1. Training of Met
Ed operators and supervisors was inadequate and contributed
significantly to the seriousness of the accident. The training program
gave insufficient emphasis to principles of reactor safety.
2. The TMI training
program conformed to the NRC standard for training. Moreover, TMI
operator license candidates had higher scores than the national average
on NRC licensing examinations and operating tests. Nevertheless, the
training of the operators proved to be inadequate for responding to the
accident.
3. NRC standards
allowed a shallow level of operator training.
a. The Operator
Licensing Branch activities were principally restricted to preparing
and giving initial licensing examinations and occasional visits to
vendors for an informal spot check of start-up certification tests.
The branch was heavily involved in the initial start-up of the B&W
cold licensing program in the early 1970s. A paper review of B&W's
course for new plant operator training was performed without comment
in 1976.
b. NRC prescribed
only minimal requirements for operator training. There were no minimum
educational requirements for operators; there was no requirement for
checks to be made on the psychological fitness of candidates or
whether they had criminal records.
c. An individual
could fail parts of either the NRC licensing examination or the
utility requalification examination, including sections on emergency
procedures and equipment, and still pass the overall examination by
getting a passing average score, and qualify to operate the reactor.
d. The NRC had no
criteria for the qualifications of those individuals who carry out the
operator training program. It also did not conduct regular in-depth
reviews of the training programs.
4. Met Ed had
primary responsibility for the training of operators. The quality of the
training program at TMI was low.
a. The training
program was quantitatively and qualita- tively understaffed as well as
conceptually weak; emphasis was not given to fundamental understanding
of the reactor and little time was devoted to instruction in the
biological hazards of radiation. The content was left to the
instructors, who had no greater formal educational qualifications than
those of their students.
b. TMI-2's
station manager, unit superintendent, and supervisor of operations
were not involved in operator training.
c. With NRC
approval, the unit superintendent and the station manager at TMI were
only required to acquire the experience and training necessary to be
examined for a senior reactor operator license, but were not required
to hold such a license.
d. Although
auxiliary operators performed tasks that could affect reactor power
level or involve the handling of radioactive material, there was no
formally defined training program for them.
e. Met Ed did not
request waivers from employees with naval reactor experience to allow
examination of their Navy records.
5. TMI contracted
with B&W to carry out a portion of the TMI operator training. B&W
performed only those functions specifically required under the
agreement.
a. There was
little interaction in B&W between those who conducted training and
those responsible for nuclear plant design. Course content and conduct
of courses were made up by the B&W training department, entirely on
its own. There were no formal syllabi or training manuals.
b. The simulator
at B&W was a key tool in the training of operators. Simulator training
did not include preparation of the operators for multiple-failure
accidents. Indeed, the B&W simulator was not, prior to March 28,
programmed to reproduce the conditions that confronted the operators
during the accident. It was unable to simulate increasing pressurizer
level at the same time that reactor coolant pressure was dropping.
