Overview:
THE
UTILITY
When the decision was
made to make nuclear power available for the commercial generation of
energy, it was placed into the hands of the existing electric utilities.
Nuclear power requires management qualifications and attitudes of a very
special character as well as an extensive support system of scientists and
engineers. We feel that insufficient attention was paid to this by the
General Public Utilities Corporation (GPU).
There is a divided
system of decision-making within GPU and its subsidiaries. While the
utility has legal responsibility for a wide range of fundamental
decisions, from plant design to operator training some utilities have to
rely heavily on the expertise of their suppliers and on the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Our report contains a number of examples where this
divided responsibility, in the case of TMI, may have led to less than
optimal design and operating practices. For example, we have received
contradictory testimony on how the criteria under which the containment
building isolates were selected. Similarly, the design of the control room
seems to have been a compromise among of the utility, its parent company,
the architect-engineer, and the nuclear steam system supplier (with very
little attention from the NRC). But the clearest example of the
shortcomings of divided responsibility is the area of operator training.
The legal
responsibility for training operators and supervisors for safe operation
of nuclear power plants rests with the utility. However, Met Ed, the GPU
subsidiary which operates TMI, did not have sufficient expertise to carry
out this training program without outside help. They, therefore,
contracted with Babcock & Wilcox, supplier of the nuclear steam system,
for various portions of this training program. While B&W has substantial
expertise, they had no responsibility for the quality of the total
training program, only for carrying out the contracted portion. And
coordination between the training programs of the two companies was
extremely loose. For example, the B&W instructors were not aware of the
precise operating procedures in effect at the plant.
A key tool in the B&W
training is a "simulator," which is a mock control console that can
reproduce realistically events that happen within a power plant. The
simulator differs in certain significant way from the actual control
console. Also, the simulator was not programmed, prior to March 28, to
reproduce the conditions that confronted the operators during the
accident.
We found that at both
companies, those most knowledgeable about th workings of the nuclear power
plant have little communication with those responsible for operator
training, and therefore, the content of the instructional program does not
lead to sufficient understanding of reactor systems.
It is our conclusion
that the role that the NRC plays in monitoring operator training
contributes little and may actually aggravate the problem. NRC has a
limited staff for supervising operator licensing, and many of these do not
have actual experience in power plants. Therefore, NRC activities are
limited to the administration of fairly routine licensing examinations and
the spotchecking of requalification exams and training programs. In
evaluating the training of operators to carry out emergency procedures,
NRC failed to recognize basic faults in the procedures in existence at
TMI. Since the utility has the tendency of equating the passing of an NRC
examination with the satisfactory training of operators, NRC may be
perpetuating a level of mediocrity.
The way that NRC
evaluates the safety of proposed plants during the licensing process has a
most unfortunate impact on the way operators are trained. Since during the
licensing process applicants for licenses concentrate on the consequences
of single failures, there is no attempt in the training program to prepare
operators for accidents in which two systems fail independently of each
other.
There were significant
deficiencies in the management of the TMI-2 plant. Shift foremen were
burdened with paper work not relevant to supervision and could not
adequately fulfill their supervisory roles. There was no systematic check
on the status of the plant and the line-up of valves when shifts changed.
Surveillance procedures were not adequately supervised. And there were
weaknesses in the program of quality assurance and control.
We agree that the
utility that operates a nuclear power plant must be held responsible for
the fundamental design and procedures that assure nuclear safety. However,
the analysis of this particular accident raises the serious question of
whether all electric utilities automatically have the necessary technical
expertise and managerial capabilities for administering such a dangerous
high-technology plant. We, therefore, recommend the development of higher
standards of organization and management that a company must meet before
it is granted a license to operate a nuclear power plant.
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